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The debate regarding the nature of joint action has come
to a stalemate due to a dependence on intuitional methods.
Normativists, such as Margaret Gilbert, argue that action-
relative normative relations are inherent in joint action,
while non-normativists, such as Michael Bratman, claim
that there are minimal cases of joint action without norma-
tive relations. In this work, we describe the first experi-
mental examinations of these intuitions, and report the
results of six studies that weigh in favor of the normativist
paradigm. Philosophical ramifications and further exten-
sions of this work are then discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
While sitting at a café you notice two people come around the corner, walk down the street largely in
lockstep, and then turn out of view at the next intersection. Do they just happen to be walking next to
each other or are they walking together? If you are a jealous spouse, or a police officer conducting
surveillance, the answer to this question takes on special importance, but even for a disinterested
observer there is an intuitive difference between these two possibilities; acting together appears to
require more than parallel action in close proximity.1 However, what accounts for this difference?
What conditions need to be satisfied for two people to do something together?
In the philosophical literature on joint action, several theories using the related notions of collec-
tive, shared, joint, or we-intentions have been proposed to regiment this difference, explain how joint
actions are initiated, executed, and maintained, and clarify the relation between individual and collec-
tive mentality and action. Although there is almost universal agreement on the importance of the dis-
tinction drawn above, and the partial irreducibility of the collective to the individual, these views
vary widely on several issues. One axis along which these theories differ is the role of normative rela-
tions such as obligations, rights, and entitlements between the participants in the constitution of joint
1 Thanks to Hans Bernhard Schmid (personal communication) for the examples.
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action (Schmid, 2009, p. 53). Normativists, including Margaret Gilbert (2006, 2009, 2013), Abraham
Roth (2004, 2014) and Anthonie Meijers (2003), argue that joint actions always involve these norma-
tive relations. Part of what it is for an action to count as a genuine case of acting together is that obli-
gations, rights, and entitlements exist between the participants. Gilbert, for example, states that
“obligations and entitlements—not necessarily moral obligations and rights—are inherent in acting
together” (2013, p. 53). In contrast, non-normativists including John Searle (1990, 2010), Michael
Bratman (2006, 2009, 2013) and The Tuomelas (Tuomela, 2005; Tuomela & Tuomela, 2003), argue
that joint action only involves some structure of psychological attitudes as an essential feature. It is
therefore possible to have a joint action without any genuine commitments, obligations, or entitle-
ments. The following quote from Bratman is representative:
Now, I agree that mutual obligations and entitlements are extremely common in cases
of modest sociality, though I think that these will normally be familiar kinds of moral
obligation…But…I am not convinced that such obligations are essential to modest soci-
ality (Bratman, 2009, pp. 151–152).
For Bratman, cases of modest sociality involve shared intentions, which is enough to distinguish
them from individual action. There are at least two areas of substantive disagreement between Brat-
man and Gilbert: (1) Are normative relations inherent in joint action, even in cases of modest social-
ity? And, (2) Are these normative relations specific to the joint action in question, or are they
dependent on general, global, moral conceptions?
To address these questions, both normativists and non-normativists employ thought experiments
featuring vignettes of people undertaking some project together, such as walking together, pushing a
car, making hollandaise sauce, playing a symphony, and so on. These thought experiments are meant
to elicit intuitions about the presence or absence of normative relations between the participants of
the joint action. Currently, both groups take their examples to be conclusive. On the non-normativist
side, Bratman states his case as follows:
Consider a variant of the example of walking together highlighted in Gilbert's work.
Suppose you and I are independently walking down Fifth Avenue. We spot each other
on 65th Street, and we briefly walk together, chatting, until, as it happens, you peel off
at 59th Street. We do not merely walk individually along the same stretch of street and
at the same time. Rather, we intentionally walk together for this brief time, and we
briefly have a shared intention to walk together. Nevertheless, it seems strained to insist
[our emphasis], barring the introduction of further features to the story, that either has
an obligation to the other not to opt out without the other's permission (2006, p. 7).
Based on this example, Bratman concludes that there are instances of joint action that do not involve
normative commitments, but still meet the requirements for modest sociality. Arguing for the norma-
tivists, Gilbert tells the following story:
Suppose that Heinrich and Andrea are going for a walk together…Suppose now that
Heinrich suddenly claps his hand to his brow, says “Oh No!” and, without further ado,
starts walking rapidly away from Andrea. Andrea may not be disappointed that he has
gone. Barring special background understandings, however, she will understand that—
to put it somewhat abstractly—the manner of his going involved a mistake [original
emphasis]. It is a mistake by virtue of the fact that they were walking together…Given
that this is so, Andrea evidently understands that by virtue of their walking together she
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has a right of some kind to Heinrich's continuing to walk alongside her…together with
the standing to issue related rebukes and demands (2013, pp. 25–26).
Gilbert is explicit about her methodology of examining these quotidian cases of acting together, and
claims that her “warrant for the description is informal observation including self-observation” (2013,
p. 24). On this basis, she takes it as demonstrated that even minimal joint actions inherently involve
normative relations.
Despite the similarity of these two examples, Bratman and Gilbert come to opposite conclusions
about fundamental aspects of acting together, and each appears as certain of their position as the
other. Given their certainty and the intuitional methodology involved in arguing for each position, it
is perhaps surprising that there is a dearth of empirical research on said intuitions. Furthermore,
although there have been fruitful interactions between the normativists and non-normativists, espe-
cially between Bratman (2009, 2013) and Gilbert (2009, 2013), it appears that the philosophical dis-
cussion has reached a stalemate.
To remedy this, our paper takes an empirical approach to examine common intuitions about
everyday conceptions of acting together. We are interested in people's ability to detect the presence
of normative relations as a function of increasing evidence of joint action, or, in the converse case,
their ability to infer the pre-existence of a joint action from some normative interaction. Here, we
expect to find that judgments regarding the existence of normative relations will track perceived joint
actions, and vice versa. That is, given cases of joint action, participants will judge that there are nor-
mative relations between the actors, and given cases involving normative relations, participants will
judge that the actors are acting together. Furthermore, we are also interested in the difference between
normative relations that may depend on a particular joint action, and those that may be accounted for
by general moral considerations. Gilbert, for example, distinguishes between obligations arising from
joint commitments and moral obligation (2006, pp. 157–159) and argues that the normativity that
arises in joint action is present even in cases that are morally objectionable (2009, pp. 183–184). In
contrast, Bratman argues that any obligation or entitlement in joint action “will normally be familiar
kinds of moral obligation” (2009, p. 151).2 On this issue, we expect that individuals will recognize
obligations between actors engaging in behavior that they take to be immoral.
To test these hypotheses, we have developed six studies. Study 1 examines whether joint actions
that involve one actor helping another generate an obligation to notify, where the helper must notify
the person being helped that they are leaving the joint action. In Study 2, we reverse the perspective,
asking participants whether the actor being helped has standing to rebuke the helper for leaving the
joint action. In Studies 3 and 4, we modify these cases by removing the helping element and checking
whether the standing to rebuke and the obligation to notify, respectively, are affected. In Study 5, we
invert the treatment to see whether participants infer that two people are acting together when there is
evidence of normative relations between them. Finally, in Study 6, we test whether people attribute
obligations to actors taking part in an action judged to be immoral.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sections 1–6 detail the corresponding studies.
Section 7 discusses various philosophical consequences, both for the normativist and non-
normativists in general, and Bratman and Gilbert in particular, and ends by considering ideas for the
direction of future empirical research on joint action. Section 7 concludes.
2 Although Bratman does qualify this with “normally” here, it is clear from the summation of his statements on the issue that moral
obligation is the only kind of obligation in joint action, and that they are only present in some joint actions (2006, pp. 7–8; 2009,
pp. 151–152; 2013, pp. 110–111).
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1 | STUDY 1: THE OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY IN THE CAR PUSHING CASE
This study focuses on the impact of helping behavior in an instance of liminal joint action. The
vignette (q.v., Appendix S2 for the full prompts, Supporting information) is based on a thought
experiment discussed by John Searle (1990, p. 404), who relates the story as follows:
I see a man pushing a car in the street in an effort to get it started; and I simply start
pushing with him. No words are exchanged and there is no convention according to
which I push his car. But it is a case of collective behavior. In such a case, “I am push-
ing only as part of our” pushing.
Although Searle does not explicitly side with the non-normativists in this example, he does so in later
work (2010, cf., p. 50), and this case is often taken as an example in which there is joint action but
no normative relations.3
Because we are interested in the relation between joint action and normativity, we constructed
three variations of the prompt, each increasing the evidence of joint action between two fictional
actors, Will and Alexander. Every condition begins with Will's car broken down on the side of the
road. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of our three conditions, producing a 3 × 1
between-subjects design. In our control condition, where we give no evidence of any joint action
among the actors, Alexander merely walks by without helping Will. Our second condition features
liminal, or low, joint action, where Alexander stops to help Will for a few brief seconds and then
leaves without saying anything. Our third and last condition features high evidence of joint action,
with Alexander vocalizing his desire to help, “Here, let me help,” before helping Will push the car
for many minutes and then leaving without saying anything. After reading the prompt, participants
were asked a series of questions relating to the dependent measures investigated.
Study 1 generates two predictions that follow the normativist account. First, participants should
indicate that there is a greater obligation for Alexander to notify Will that he is leaving in both the
low and high joint action conditions compared to the control condition. Second, if our conditions
genuinely vary by increasing evidence of joint action, then participants should give increasing ratings
of togetherness from the control to the low and high joint action conditions.
1.1 | Method
One hundred and fifty-three American adults (49% self-identified as female) were recruited online
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Seven additional participants were excluded from analyses for failing
to complete the study.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, producing a 3 × 1 between-
subjects design. As mentioned above, in our control, or no joint action condition, 46 participants were
presented with a word prompt in which Alexander did not help Will push his car. In the low joint
action condition, 55 participants read a prompt where Alexander helps Will push his car for a few
seconds. Finally, in the high joint action condition, 52 participants read a prompt where Alexander
vocalizes his desire to help, and does so for many minutes before leaving. In each condition, partici-
pants were instructed to answer the same four questions detailed below, presented in random order,
which constitute our dependent measures. Afterwards, participants were directed to answer a series
of demographic questions (q.v., Appendix S2).
3 Examples of this kind go at least as far back as Hume's case of two men rowing a boat without explicit agreement
(1740/1976, p. 490).
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1. Togetherness measure: “Were Alexander and Will acting together?”, anchored at 0 (“Not at
all”) and 6 (“Totally working together”). This measure serves as our first manipulation check.
2. Notification measure: “Should Alexander, the passer-by, notify Will that he is walking off?”,
anchored at 0 (“No obligation at all to notify”) and 6 (“Total obligation to notify”). This mea-
sure tests for the presence of normative relations between the characters in the prompt.
3. Helping measure: “To what extent did Alexander help Will?”, anchored at 0 (“Not at all”)
and 6 (“Did everything he should”). This measure serves as our second manipulation check.
4. Obligation to help: “Does Alexander have an obligation to help Will?”, anchored at 0 (“No
obligation to help”) and 6 (“Total obligation to help”). This measure tests for the presence of
global moral considerations.
1.2 | Results
We first tested participant ratings in our four measures for normality; however, Kolmogorov–
Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk's tests showed that participant scores were not normally distributed (all
p < .05). We then used a series of non-parametric tests to analyze the data: Kruskal–Wallis compari-
sons between our three conditions, pairwise comparisons adjusted by Bonferroni corrections for mul-
tiple tests, and Spearman's Rho for correlations.4
Results were generally consistent with our two normativist predictions (see Figure 1). Our manip-
ulation, increasing the evidence of joint action between conditions, was successfully tracked by our
participants and yielded a significant main effect, H(2) = 100.16, p < .001.5 Median tendencies
(hereafter “Mdns”) of participants' scores in our togetherness measure increased between our condi-
tions with values of 0 in our control, compared to 3 in our low joint action and 4.5 in our high joint
action condition. Corrected pairwise comparisons showed that all our conditions significantly differed
from one another (all p ≤ .001 and all effect sizes r ≥ .35; see Appendix S1 for more details of all
pairwise comparisons throughout the paper). Hence, our manipulation significantly increased percep-
tions of togetherness across our conditions.
Similarly, participants' ratings in our notification measure were significantly higher between both
our low and high joint action conditions (Mdns = 4 and 3.5 respectively) and our control condition
FIGURE 1 Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in Study 1. Bolded horizontal
lines represent the medians of our measures, while “X” represents the means. Points represent furthest outliers where available
4 Given the relative scarcity of non-parametric models used in most previous experimental philosophy work, we have formatted our
results following those presented by Diaz, Viciana and Gomila's recent (2017) paper on the seminal side-effect, or “Knobe”, effect.
5 E2R = .65; refer to Appendix S1 for an explanation of how our effect sizes (including “r” and “rm”) were calculated.
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(Mdn = 0), yielding a significant effect between conditions, H(2) = 61, p < .001.6 As one might
infer from the slight difference among our median scores, corrected pairwise comparisons did not
yield a significant difference between low and high joint action conditions, but we did find significant
differences between these conditions and our control (both comparisons p ≤ .001 and r ≥ .66). Par-
ticipants did not judge that there was a greater obligation to notify in the high joint action condition
than in the low joint action condition, but they did judge that there was an obligation to help in both
of our joint action conditions compared with our control condition.
Participants' ratings of whether Alexander helped Will were highly correlated with their ratings of
the extent to which the characters were acting together, rs = 0.847, p < .001. Unsurprisingly, results
from our helping measure follow the same pattern as our togetherness measure, with median scores
significantly increasing from our control (0) to our low (2) and high joint action conditions (5).7 Cor-
rected pairwise comparisons again showed that all our conditions significantly differed from one
another.8
At the same time, there were no significant differences between our conditions for our obligation
to help measure. The means of participants' scores give further descriptive evidence that participants
did not judge there to be any global moral obligation for Alexander to help Will (see Figure 1).
1.3 | Discussion
Overall, these findings suggest that there is an easily recognized phenomenon corresponding to the
technical notion of joint action.9 Participants clearly distinguished the control case from either of the
joint action cases when asked whether the individuals are acting together. This finding is supported
by previous survey research conducted by Deborah Tollefsen and colleagues, which found that par-
ticipants readily identify situations (e.g., playing poker) that are a priori categorized as involving joint
action (Tollefsen, Kreuz & Dale, 2014). Furthermore, the findings appear to support the normativist
account. When there is some evidence of two agents acting together, people judge that one actor in
the joint action has an obligation to notify the other when they plan to terminate the joint action, and
that the specific obligation is separable from any general moral obligations to help a stranger in need.
This is shown by the pronounced difference between the control condition and the joint action condi-
tions on the obligation to notify dependent measure and the lack of any significant differences
between the means for our general obligation to help dependent measure.
2 | STUDY 2: THE RIGHT TO REBUKE IN THE CAR PUSHING CASE
In the previous study, we looked at only one side of the normative relation between contributors to a
joint action. However, the action-specific normative relations for which the normativists argue are
bidirectional. It is not only that one actor has an obligation to notify the other; each actor also has the
standing to rebuke the other for their failure to complete their part of the action or to fulfill their
action-specific obligations. Using the same prompts and design, we merely changed one of our
dependent measures to reflect the change in perspective from an obligation on the part of the
6 E2R = .4.
7 H(2) = 105.106, p < .001, E2R = .69.
8 All p ≤ .001 and all effect sizes r ≥ .42 See Table 1 in Appendix S1.
9 Though many of our means are “below the mid-point” of our scale (i.e., 3 out of 6), what we are primarily concerned with is the rela-
tive differences between our conditions. Recall that the highest end of our scales was coded as “total” obligation or “totally” working
together, thus it is not surprising that such language may have pushed scores below the mid-point. However, enough variability was
obtained to result in significant differences between mean scores. Thanks to John Greenwood for these observations.
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contributor who leaves, to the right of the participant to rebuke a contributor who leaves without sat-
isfying their obligation. The aim of this study was to see whether this bidirectionality obtains. If the
normativist account is correct, participants should be more willing to allow a rebuke in the conditions
that have instances of joint action than in our control condition.
2.1 | Method
One hundred and fifty-two American adults (51% self-identified as female) were recruited online via
Amazon Mechanical Turk. As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of three condi-
tions, producing a 3 × 1 between-subjects design (all prompts were identical to those used in Study
1). Fifty-one participants were assigned to our control condition, with 49 and 52 assigned to our low
and high joint action conditions, respectively. Participants were given the same dependent variable
and demographic measures, except for the question concerning Alexander's obligation to notify,
replacing it with a Rebuke Measure. Here, we asked participants “How acceptable would it be for
Will to call out to Alexander and say ‘Hey, where are you going?’” As with Study 1, participants
responded according to a seven-point scale anchored at 0 (“Totally unacceptable”) and 6 (“Totally
acceptable”).
2.2 | Results
Again, participants' scores were not normally distributed (Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk's
tests all p < .05), necessitating the use of non-parametric tests. Additionally, our two manipulation
checks confirmed that participants correctly tracked increasing levels of togetherness and helping
across our conditions.10 Mirroring our findings for Study 1, corrected pairwise comparisons revealed
that participant scores for these two measures significantly increased between conditions (see
Figure 2 and Appendix S1, Table 2).11 There were no significant differences in participants' ratings
for our obligation to help measure across conditions, confirming that in these car-pushing cases there
is no moral obligation to provide help.12
FIGURE 2 Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in Study 2. Bolded horizontal
lines represent the medians of our measures, while “X” represents the means. Points represent furthest outliers where available
10 Kruskal-Wallis independent samples measures: H(2) = 92.89, p < .001, E2R= .61 for our togetherness measure and H(2) = 93.15,
p < .001, E2R= .62 for our helping measure.
11 All pairwise comparisons p ≤ .001, r ≥ .35.
12 H(2) = 1.514, p = .469.
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Results for our new rebuke measure, on the other hand, differed from our predictions. Increasing
evidence of joint action in our conditions did not yield a main effect on participants' ratings of the
permissibility of rebuke; however, a closer examination showed that participants judged that it was
significantly more acceptable for Will to “call out” Alexander in the low joint action condition
(Mdn = 3) than in the control condition (Mdn = 1).13 Furthermore, the effect size of this difference
(rm = .24) is far smaller than what was obtained with our notify measure in Study 1 between the same
two conditions (r = .7). Other comparisons between conditions did not reach significance.
2.3 | Discussion
There are at least two potential explanations of this result. First, contrary to our hypothesis, the bidir-
ectionality that the normativists propose may not be fully recognized by folk intuitions. This is sug-
gested by two facts: there is no significant difference in the acceptability of rebuke between the
control condition and the high joint action condition, and the difference between the control condition
and low joint action condition does not match the strength of our notification measure from Study 1.
We, however, take a second explanation to be more plausible. On this interpretation, we must
draw a distinction between the justification to claim your right to rebuke and your standing to hold
such a right. This is a point made by Gilbert who claims that “Standing, incidentally, must be sharply
distinguished from justification. One may have the standing to demand something of someone, yet
not be justified in doing so, in the circumstances” (2009, p. 177, emphasis hers). In the example Gil-
bert discusses, she points out that if you are acting together with someone who fails to fulfill their
obligation, you only have a standing to rebuke, but there may be good reasons not to do so. If you
know that your partner is particularly sensitive and will have a crisis of conscience if rebuked, it
would be wrong to rebuke him. In other words, even though you have the standing to rebuke, given
your knowledge of your partner's personality, actually rebuking your partner would not be justified.
Gilbert's discussion of the issue suggests a range of factors that may limit justification (2006, p. 147;
2009, pp. 177–178). Nonetheless, Gilbert holds that the presence of a joint commitment explains not
only the standing to rebuke but also the occurrences of such rebukes (2006, p. 148).
We may then draw a parallel to the case developed in our experiment. The results suggest that the
participants do not strongly think that Will is justified in rebuking Alexander, but this may be due to
another factor, such as the fact that Alexander is helping Will. The presence of helping behavior may
influence judgments about justification. Because Alexander voluntarily undertakes some action on
Will's behalf, they are on unequal moral terms, and this may affect the normativity associated with
the specific action. Thus, although Will may have the standing to rebuke Alexander, he shouldn't, all
things considered, because Alexander has voluntarily assisted him.
Second, notice that this issue did not arise in Study 1. One possible explanation for this is the
change of perspective. In Study 1, the normative relation is viewed from the perspective of the person
doing the helping. Because of this, any notice from the helper that he is leaving is likely to be seen as
a positive gesture, and in turn, generate a positive response. However, in Study 2 we are viewing the
normative relation from the perspective of the person who owes the other person; thus calling out
appears to lack the appropriate gratefulness. It may be interpreted negatively and result in an
unwanted response. Because of this possibility, only people who are convinced that Alexander and
Will are acting together are willing to take the risk. One possible effect of this is that the more partici-
pants take Alexander and Will to be acting together, the more they take the right to rebuke to be
13 Kruskal–Wallis test across all conditions: H(2) = 5.56, p = .062, E2R= .04; Mann–Whitney U test between control and low joint
action conditions: U = 912.5, z = −2.36, p = .018, rm = .24.
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justified. This explanation is also partially supported by a positive correlation between participants'
judgments of togetherness and their scores on our acceptability to rebuke measure (rs = .139,
p < .05). That is, participants who saw the actors as working together gave higher scores on our
acceptability to rebuke measure.
Due to these two considerations, the results do not appear to speak decisively against a normati-
vist view that includes a distinction between justification and standing, and it remains unclear which
interpretation is correct. One way to clarify this issue is to consider a case in which claiming the right
to rebuke is more likely to be justified. Given the proposal above, such a case should involve people
acting together on neutral terms, and avoid actions in which one party is helping another. To see
whether helping has a genuine effect on justification, we developed our next two studies.
3 | STUDY 3: THE RIGHT TO REBUKE IN THE WALKING CASE
In this study, we introduced a new vignette that directly represents the disagreement between Gilbert
and Bratman discussed in the introduction. Because Bratman takes walking together to be a case of
modest sociality that does not generate normative relations and Gilbert takes it to be a paradigmatic
case of joint action that does generate such relations, this is the vignette that most directly bears on
that debate. Furthermore, by considering a case in which neither actor is helping the other, we can
more clearly isolate the normative relations that exist between members of the group without the
interference of external moral considerations.
This study has two central aims. First, by focusing specifically on the example Bratman provides
we can determine whether normative relations are present in cases of modest sociality. Along with
the normativists, we hypothesize that judgments regarding the acceptability of a rebuke will increase
when there is evidence of joint action. Second, this study, which includes actors on equal terms,
sheds light on the issues raised in Study 2 regarding the dampening effects of helping behavior on
the justification to rebuke. If there is no increase in the acceptability of rebuke between control and
joint action conditions, it suggests that the normative relation may not be bidirectional as justification
becomes a less relevant issue. On the other hand, if there is an increase in acceptability, it suggests
that helping behavior influences justification.
3.1 | Methods
One hundred and sixty American adults (43% self-identified as female) were recruited online via
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Nineteen additional participants were excluded from analyses for failing
to complete the study.
As with previous studies, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, produc-
ing a 3 × 1 between-subjects design. Fifty-three participants were assigned to our control condition,
with 56 and 51 individuals assigned to our low and high joint action conditions, respectively.
Our conditions in this study vary the strength of behavioral signals and cues among two people
that are walking together (q.v., Appendix S2 for the full prompts). In the control condition, partici-
pants read a prompt where two people are independently walking down 5th Avenue and, starting at
65th street, they walk beside each other, until, as it happens, one of them peels off at 59th street. In
the low joint action condition, they walk together the same distance, but they “spot one another” at
65th street and then briefly walk together, chatting, until one of them peels off at 59th street. In the
high joint action condition, in addition to spotting each other and chatting, they laugh and maintain
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their pace. After reading the word prompts, participants are directed to answer two dependent mea-
sures displayed in random order and detailed below, and a series of demographic questions:
1. Togetherness measure: “To what extent were the two people acting together?”, anchored at
0 (“Not at all”) and 6 (“Totally working together”).
2. Rebuke measure: “Does the person who stays have the right to call out the person who peels
off?”, anchored at 0 (“No right at all to call out”) and 6 (“Total right to call out”)
3.2 | Results
Consistent with our previous studies, participant scores were not normally distributed (normality tests
for all our measures p < .05). Participants successfully tracked increasing evidence of joint action
across our conditions, as corrected pairwise comparisons of participant scores for our togetherness
measure significantly increased between our control (Mdn = 1) and our low (Mdn = 3) and high
(Mdn = 4) joint action conditions (both p < .001, and r ≥ .51; see Figure 3 and Appendix S1,
Table 3).14 Median scores between our two joint action conditions were not statistically different
from one another.
Increasing evidence of joint action among our vignettes resulted in an effect on our rebuke mea-
sure, H(2) = 15.39, p < .001.15 That is, participants in either of our joint action conditions judged
the acceptability of rebuke to be higher than in the control condition.16 However, as with our togeth-
erness measure, scores between our two joint action conditions did not significantly differ.
Our measures showed a significant positive correlation with one another (rs = .513, p < .001).
That is, participants who judged that the actors were walking together were far more likely to also
judge that there was standing to rebuke. These results led us to test whether these judgments of
togetherness are mediating judgments of rebuke.
FIGURE 3 Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in Study 3. Bolded horizontal
lines represent the medians of our measures, while “X” represents the means. Points represent furthest outliers where available
14 Kruskal–Wallis independent samples measures: H(2) = 42.15, p < .001, E2R = .26.
15 E2R = .09.
16 Corrected pairwise comparisons p < .01, r ≥ .28.
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3.3 | Mediation analysis
We conducted a single mediation analysis as described by Hayes (2013).17 Togetherness scores were
used as the sole mediator, with our conditions serving as the independent variable and rebuke scores
serving as our dependent measure. We performed our mediation via 5,000 bootstrapped samples in
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) (see Figure 4). We found a significant indirect effect of our conditions on
rebuke scores through participants' judgments of togetherness, ab = 0.542, (95% CI: 0.295, 0.859).
Our mediator could account for nearly 80% of the total effect (PM = .785). We performed a Sobel
test that confirmed this strong partial mediation (z = 4.45, p < .0001). Following Rose and Nichols
(2013), we verified this model by comparing our findings to a model that reversed the mediation,
using rebuke scores as a mediator on togetherness scores—the reverse model could only account for
25% of the total effect.
3.4 | Discussion
These results generally conformed to our predictions. In this case of minimal sociality, centering on
two people who just happen to walk parallel to each other for a stretch of blocks, we still find that
increasing evidence of joint action via subtle behavioral cues will result in a robust shift of partici-
pants' intuitions such that they infer the existence of normative relations (e.g., a right to rebuke).
Though the medians for participants' judgments of the right to rebuke never approached ceiling, the
difference between medians in the control condition (Mdn = 0) and the low joint action condition
(Mdn = 1) were still significant and indicative of a moderate effect (r = .28). This shift is arguably
cleaner and far stronger than the shift between our control and low joint action conditions in Study
2, where helping behavior may have obscured the difference. The fact that participants' scores for
rebuke rarely crossed the midpoint is indicative that these cases of minimal sociality do not present
sufficient evidence of one's justification to strongly rebuke another. While, again, this dampening
does not demonstrate that the normative relations inherent in joint action fail to be bidirectional, it
does indicate that other contextual considerations bear on the right to rebuke, and hence that the right
to rebuke is somewhat dissimilar to other normative relations, such as an obligation to notify.
A possible explanation for the results of Study 2 was that participants' judgments of togetherness
drove their acceptability to rebuke. In this cleaner experiment, we find that judgments of togetherness
serve as a robust partial mediator of scores to rebuke. This confirms our hypothesis that the increased
FIGURE 4 Mediation analysis for Study 3
17 Mediation analyses were also conducted for Studies 1 and 2, but failed to show clear effects, likely due to the presence of helping as
discussed in 2.3.
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scores of togetherness will predict increased willingness to rebuke; a finding that fits the normativist
paradigm. That is, judgments of togetherness are doing much of the work of modulating participants'
intuitions about the existence of normative relations.
Finally, participants failed to track what we took to be increasing evidence of joint action between
the low and high joint action conditions. It is likely that the differences between the behavioral cues
used in the low and high joint action conditions were too subtle; however, this does not affect our
overall findings. The point of tension between normativists and non-normativists revolves around
liminal cases of mild sociality, which was successfully captured by our design.
In our next study, we aim to test the robustness of this walking vignette by reintroducing our orig-
inal dependent measure testing whether there is an obligation to notify in minimal cases of joint
action. At the same time, testing intuitions of obligation may help us understand whether and to what
extent the normative relations of rebuke and obligation to notify are dissimilar.
4 | STUDY 4: THE OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY IN THE WALKING CASE
This study keeps many of the features introduced in Study 3. Word prompts, conditions, demo-
graphic questions, and comprehension check remained identical. We replaced our rebuke measure
with a notification measure similar to the one used in Study 1 (i.e., a seven-point scale with the
prompt, “Should the person who peels off notify the other that they're leaving?”, anchored at 0 [“No
obligation at all to notify”] and 6 [“Total obligation to notify”]). Given our findings from Studies 1 to
3, we predict that participants' ratings on this measure will increase from control to joint action condi-
tions, and the effects for this notification measure will be more pronounced than the rebuke measure
used in Study 3.
4.1 | Methods
One hundred and seventy-one American adults (46% self-identified as female) were recruited online
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Twelve additional participants were excluded from analyses for failing
to complete the study.
As with previous studies, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, produc-
ing a 3 × 1 between-subjects design. Fifty-three participants were assigned to our control condition,
with 59 individuals assigned to both our low and high joint action conditions. The conditions and
dependent measures are described in section 3.1, with our main dependent measure modified as
described in 4.
4.2 | Results
Participant scores were not normally distributed.18 Replicating our results from Study 3, participants
tracked increasing evidence of joint action between control and both joint action conditions, but not
between our two joint action conditions—although this contrast was trending toward significance at
p = .06 (see Figure 5 and Appendix S1, Table 4).19
Confirming our prediction, participants' scores for our notification measure were significantly
higher in either of our joint action conditions than in our control condition, showing an effect—
18 Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk's for both measures p < .05.
19 Kruskal-Wallis independent samples measures: H(2) = 47.61, p < .001, E2R= .28; significant corrected pairwise comparisons both
p < .001, r ≥ .48.
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comparatively larger than with our rebuke measure in Study 3—across our conditions H(2) = 77.98,
p < .001.20 Again, scores between our two joint action conditions did not significantly differ.
As with Study 3, our two measures significantly correlated with one another (rs = .62, p < .001).
This correlation led us to conduct a similar mediation analysis to 3.3, testing whether participants'
judgments of togetherness may be mediating their scores on our notification measure.
4.3 | Mediation analysis
Following section 3.3, judgments of togetherness were used as the sole mediator, with our conditions
serving as the independent variable and ratings of obligation serving as our dependent measure. We
performed our mediation via 5,000 bootstrapped samples in PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). Judgments of
togetherness treated as our mediator could account for nearly 40% of the total effect (PM = .383).
However, when we reversed the mediation, following the recommendations of Rose and Nichols
(2013), we found that participants' scores on our notification measure served as a far stronger media-
tor of the effect of condition assignment on judgments of togetherness (see Figure 6).21 Our notifica-
tion measure could now account for over 62% of the total effect (PM = .621).
22
4.4 | Discussion
These results, again, confirm that even in minimal cases of joint action, such as the walking vignette
adapted from Bratman (2006), participants infer the presence of normative relations. In effect, Study
4 replicates this finding from Study 3. Additionally, the use of a similar dependent measure tracking
obligation as in Study 1 confirms that participants are especially sensitive to relations of obligation
between actors involved in a joint action. At the same time, the stronger effect produced by our notifi-
cation measure (r ≥ .7) than our previous rebuke measure used in Study 3 (r ≥ .28), suggests that
while participants do infer a right to rebuke in cases of joint action, this relation is somewhat dissimi-
lar to an obligation to notify. Though we cannot directly compare the data between these two studies,
FIGURE 5 Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in Study 4. Bolded horizontal
lines represent the medians of our measures, while “X” represents the means. Points represent furthest outliers
20 E2R = .45, significant corrected pairwise comparisons p < .001, r ≥ .7.
21 Again, thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
22 ab = .7495, 95% confidence interval: 0.494, 1.
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it suggests that our explanation of dampening in the case of rebuke is plausible. Clearly, future para-
digms should specifically target this question.
Interestingly, while togetherness scores weakly mediated our notification measure, a far stronger
mediation was obtained when we reversed the model. Participants' scores on our normative measure,
in this case notification, better predict their judgments of togetherness, rather than vice versa, as in
Study 3. This unexpected result hints at the difference between the two normative relations we have
been testing. It appears that active rebuke requires more evidence of joint action to gain justification.
In other words, participants must have some confidence that the characters are together in order to
think that actually rebuking another actor is justified. By contrast, it appears that the presence of an
obligation serves as evidence for togetherness. Furthermore, it is possible that the presence of an obli-
gation may then play a role in informing participants that there is standing for a socially riskier act of
rebuke. Comparing Figures 3 and 5 lends some credence to this view, as scores for our togetherness
measure show far more movement in Study 4 than in Study 3, even though the only modification
between the two studies was the substitution of our rebuke measure with our notification measure.
Future work using this paradigm may consider the value of combing these various normative mea-
sures and testing for possible ordering effects—the possibility of which was eliminated in our design
by the random presentation of measures. Obtaining confidence ratings from participants, perhaps
even altering the paradigms to suite the methods of signal detection theory, may also be promising
leads.
Investigating the differences and relations between our various normative judgments is a fascinat-
ing further project. However, for the purposes of this paper, we focus on the strength of association
between these judgments. The mediation analyses reveal the causal relationships between the judg-
ments of our participants, but the direction of these relationships does not fully determine the concep-
tual relationship between normative relations and acting together.23 If normative relations are part of
our concept of acting together, as the normativist claims, then there will be a strong association in
both directions between our judgments of togetherness and our judgments of normativity. If norma-
tive relations are not part of the concept of acting together, as the non-normativist claims, then we
expect to be able to generate positive judgments about joint action without that causing positive judg-
ments about normative relations. The strength of this association is therefore more indicative of the
conceptual relationship than the direction of causality in participants' judgments. Since addressing the
disagreement between normativists and non-normativists is our main focus here, we leave further
exploration of the causal relationships between participants' judgments to future research.
FIGURE 6 Mediation model for Study 4
23 Thanks are due to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to think further about this issue.
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5 | STUDY 5: THE ELEVATOR CASE
All our previous studies varied behavioral evidence of acting together and then asked participants to
make judgments about the presence of two kinds of normative relations: obligation to notify and right
to rebuke. In this study, we reverse the paradigm; that is, we increased evidence of normative rela-
tions among two fictional actors and then checked whether participants judged that the two actors
were acting together. Since this direction is less discussed in the philosophical literature, we devel-
oped our own original vignette described below (see Section 5.1 and Appendix S2 for the full
prompts).
The aim of this study is to examine whether the relationship between joint action and normativity
is symmetric. Given our previous results, we predict that if the normativist account is robust, then
participants will infer from evidence of normative relations that the characters in our vignette are act-
ing together.
5.1 | Methods
One hundred and sixty-one American adults (48.4% self-identified as female) were recruited online
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Fifteen additional participants were excluded from analyses for failing
to complete the study.
As with previous studies, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, produc-
ing a 3 × 1 between-subjects design. Fifty-three participants were assigned to our control condition,
with 54 individuals assigned to both our low and high normativity conditions.
Since our goal is to verify whether the relationship between perceived togetherness and normativ-
ity is symmetric, our conditions increase the strength of normative cues among two fictional charac-
ters. Furthermore, we had to design the prompts so as to mitigate explicit mention or evidence of
togetherness. Each of the conditions begins with an observer waiting for an elevator. Once the eleva-
tor doors open, the observer sees two men. In the control condition, the two men simply walk out of
the elevator, with the taller man following the shorter man. In our low normativity case, the shorter
man glances back at the taller man behind him, causing the taller man to speed up. We take this
manipulation to demonstrate a gentle rebuke to the slower man for lagging behind in the sense
described by Gilbert (2006, p. 148). In the high normativity condition, the shorter man turns back to
the taller man and says “Come on, hurry up!”, clearly rebuking him for his slowness. Following the
prompts, participants are then asked two questions that correspond to our dependent measures (pre-
sented in random order and listed below), after which they answer a series of demographic questions:
1. Regulation measure: “To what extent is the shorter man trying to regulate the behavior of the
taller man?” anchored at 0 (“Not at all”) and 6 (“Completely”).
2. Togetherness measure: “To what extent were the two men acting together?,” again presented
on a seven-point scale identical to the one used above
5.2 | Results
As we have come to expect with previous variants of this paradigm, participant scores were not nor-
mally distributed.24 Participants correctly tracked our manipulation of increasing evidence of norma-
tivity. Corrected pairwise comparisons of median regulation measure scores between our control
24 Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk's for both measures p < .05.
GOMEZ-LAVIN AND RACHAR 15
condition (1) and either our low (4) or high (5) normativity conditions were significantly different
(both p < .001, and r ≥ .63; see Figure 7 and Appendix S1, Table 5).25 Scores in our two normativ-
ity conditions were significantly different from one another when left uncorrected for multiple
comparisons.26
Following our predictions, participants' scores for our togetherness measure were significantly
higher in either of our normativity conditions than in our control condition, H(2) = 36.67,
p < .001.27 At the same time, corrected pairwise comparisons showed that there was no significant
difference in scores between our low and high conditions (both Mdns = 4). Furthermore, these two
measures were significantly correlated with one another (rs = .407, p < .001). Mediation models
were constructed to help determine which of our measures served as the strongest predictor.
5.3 | Mediation analysis
First, we treated scores from our regulation measure as the sole mediator, with our conditions serving
as the independent variable and ratings of togetherness serving as our dependent measure. We per-
formed our mediation via 5,000 bootstrapped samples in PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). We found a sub-
stantial and significant indirect effect of our conditions on ratings of togetherness through
participants' judgments of regulation, ab = 0.542, (95% CI: 0.176, 0.923). Our mediator could
account for nearly 60% of the total effect (PM = .594). We also performed a Sobel test that confirmed
this partial mediation (z = 3.242, p = .0012). A reversed mediation, treating togetherness measures
as our sole mediator, as we did in section 3.3, could only account for 11% of the total effect see
(Figure 8).
FIGURE 7 Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in Study 5. Bolded horizontal
lines represent the medians of our measures, while “X” represents the means. Points represent furthest outliers
25 Kruskal-Wallis independent samples measures between conditions: H(2) = 83.71, p < .001, E2R = .52.
26 Uncorrected p value = .023, corrected value adjusted for six multiple comparisons (a conservative adjustment) nearly reached our
threshold for significance (p = .068), r = .21.
27 E2R= .22.
16 GOMEZ-LAVIN AND RACHAR
5.4 | Discussion
This study indicates that the relationship between normative relations and instances of joint action is
symmetric; that is, evidence of normativity is concomitant with inferences of togetherness. Addition-
ally, the manipulations we provided in our vignette to increase evidence of normativity were robust
enough to be easily tracked and identified by participants.
At the same time, increased evidence of normativity did not correspond linearly with
increased judgments of togetherness between the low and high normativity conditions. There are
a few possible explanations for this relation. While normative relations between agents may
serve as a strong cue that they are acting together, there may be a ceiling effect to this correla-
tion; that is, more contextual evidence of a different sort might be needed to push individuals'
judgments of togetherness even higher. Future designs should consider how to test this hypothe-
sis against the risk of explicitly mentioning togetherness in the relevant prompts. However, if
we review Studies 1 and 2, we see that successfully increasing evidence of joint action from the
low to high conditions did not significantly increase judgments of normativity—a kind of
inverse pattern to what we find in Study 5. It appears that the initial, minimal, presence of joint
action implies normativity and vice versa, while increasing only evidence of either joint action
or normativity after this liminal point does not necessarily translate into higher ratings of the
second measure.
6 | STUDY 6: THE ATM ROBBING CASE
Both normativists and non-normativists allow that there are often normative relations involved in
joint action. The difference lies in whether they take these relations to be an inherent part of acting
together. On the non-normativist side, this claim is often rejected by holding that whatever normativ-
ity is present in joint action, it is a matter of general morality. Consider the following quote from
Bratman: “such temporally extended interactions among the participants [in a joint action]…fre-
quently engage familiar norms of moral obligation” (2013, p. 110). Because these are moral obliga-
tions, they do not hold in cases in which the joint action is morally reprehensible (Bratman, 2006,
pp. 151–152; 2013, pp. 110–111). On this point, Gilbert claims that “Another argument alludes to
shared intentions to do something bad. Bratman assumes that these cannot involve obligations to act
in favor of the shared intention. Yet those who share intentions to do bad things may well think other-
wise” (2009, p. 178). Gilbert suggests here that there may be a specific kind of normativity between
FIGURE 8 Mediation model for Study 5
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the participants of a joint action that gives them obligations to one another. These obligations are dis-
tinct from moral obligation in part because they may be present even if there is an overall moral obli-
gation not to commit the action.
The purpose of this study is to test whether people take there to be normative relations between
actors engaged in a morally questionable joint action. To this end, we have developed a novel
vignette that involves taking money from an ATM (q.v., Appendix S2 for full prompts). Similar to
Studies 1–4, we manipulated evidence of joint action to examine the effect this change may have on
participants' intuitions of normativity. However, we also increased evidence of moral transgression
between conditions. Given the results of Studies 1–4, where increased evidence of joint action
between low and high conditions did not resolve into increased ratings of normativity, we reduced
our conditions from three to two. If the normativist account is correct, then we would predict that par-
ticipants will be sensitive to increased evidence of joint action independently of the global moral
transgressions of the actors. That is, in the control condition, participants should judge that the char-
acter leaving the booth has no obligation to notify the other, while in the high joint action condition
participants' scores should be reversed.
6.1 | Methods
One hundred and one American adults (49% self-identified as female) were recruited online via Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk. Four additional participants were excluded from analyses for failing to com-
plete the study.
Participants were randomly assigned into our two conditions, producing a 2 × 1 between-subjects
design. Fifty participants were assigned to our control condition, with 51 individuals to our joint
action condition.
In our control condition, two people are lined up at an ATM booth. The machine malfunctions
and $20 bills start spraying out of the ATM. One person begins to furiously collect as many bills as
possible, while the other person catches the few solitary bills that hit them, and then suddenly peels
off and walks out of the booth. In our joint action condition, two people are actively breaking into an
empty ATM booth late at night. One man has the crowbar and is furiously trying to take the cover
off the ATM; the other man has a bag ready to collect the cash. In the middle of the process of break-
ing into the ATM, the bagman suddenly peels off and walks out of the booth. Afterwards, partici-
pants are directed to answer three questions, with the first two presented in random order, followed
by our standard demographic questions:
1. Notification measure: “Should the person who peels off notify the other that they're leaving?”
with a seven-point scale anchored at 0 (“No obligation at all to notify”) and 6 (“Total obliga-
tion to notify”).
2. Togetherness measure: “To what extent were the two men acting together?”, along with a
scale anchored at 0 (“Not at all”) and 6 (“Completely”).
3. Morality measure: “Were the actions taken by the two people morally wrong?”, with a
7-point scale anchored at 0 (“Not at all wrong”) and 6 (“Completely wrong”); this question
was presented following the previous two on a separate page.
6.2 | Results
Participant scores across our three measures were not normally distributed.28 As our current design has
only two conditions, Mann–Whitney comparisons between conditions were used along with
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Spearman's Rho for correlations. Participants correctly tracked both manipulations. They rated the
behavior in the joint action condition (Mdn = 6) at ceiling and thus significantly worse than in the con-
trol condition (Mdn = 5), although they also thought that the actions in the control condition were not
morally correct.29 Additionally, participants' scores for our togetherness measure were significantly
higher in our joint action condition (Mdn = 5) than in the control condition (Mdn = 1).30 Most rele-
vantly for our predictions, participants judged that the character who leaves the ATM booth had more
of an obligation to notify in the joint action condition (Mdn = 5) than in our control condition, where
medians reached the floor of our measure (Mdn = 0).31 Though all of our measures were significantly
correlated with one another, the strongest relationship was found between our togetherness and notifi-
cation measures (rs = .561, p < .001). Following our predictions, individuals who gave lower ratings
of togetherness were less likely to think that there was an extant obligation to notify, and vice versa.32
6.3 | Discussion
As our results show, in both conditions participants thought the actions undertaken by the characters
were morally wrong; however, in the joint action case the actions undertaken were seen as signifi-
cantly worse. The general findings of this study do support the view that there is a distinct kind of
normativity present between contributors to a joint action that operates independently from general
moral considerations. Our findings suggest that even when people are working together toward ques-
tionable goals there are still significant normative relations between them.33
At the same time, the present design suffers from some limitations. Because we did not vary
moral valence independently of joint action—which would have required a 2 × 2, or 3 × 2 design if
FIGURE 9 Box-and-whisker plot comparing dependent measures across our three conditions in Study 6. Bolded horizontal
lines represent the medians of our measures, while “X” represents the means. Points represent furthest outliers
28 Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk's for all measures p < .05.
29 U = 738.5, z = − 3.953, p < .001, rm = .39.
30 U = 280, z = − 6.862, p < .001, rm = .68.
31 U = 309, z = − 6.78, p < .001, rm = .67. See Figure 9 for a graphical representation.
32 Mediation models were constructed but none of them yielded significance; as condition assignment was the strongest predictor of
both our togetherness and notification measures which makes intuitive sense given that there are only two conditions.
33 One alternative explanation is that there is only an appearance of obligation resulting from a betrayal of trust between the charac-
ters. Future extensions of this paradigm might ask participants to give confidence ratings to determine the strength of the judgment that
there is a genuine obligation.
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one includes a neutrally valenced case—we cannot rule out that the negative moral valance of the
action in our vignette served as a confound; that is, that negative moral situations may produce nor-
mative relations identical to those that were produced in our previous joint action manipulations.
However, even this alternative explanation of the presence of normative relations in these vignettes
forms a challenge to non-normativist intuitions as it would suggest that normative relations between
participants strengthen proportionally with the moral wrongness of that action. Furthermore, this
explanation is unlikely, as participants still judged the behavior in our control condition to be morally
problematic—thus, the driver of judgments of normativity is likely to be connected to joint action
and not the moral considerations at play.
7 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across our studies, we find support for the general thesis that normative relations are robustly associ-
ated with joint action, which in turn suggests that, according to our common intuitions, normative
relations are inherent in joint action. This holds true both for the obligation to notify (Studies 1 and
3) and the right to rebuke (Studies 2 and 4), for cases involving helping (Studies 1 and 2) and neutral
cases (Studies 3 and 4), for the reverse direction (Study 5), and for cases in which the joint action is
morally dubious (Study 6). Although general moral considerations, such as helping behavior, did
influence the normative relations between the contributors to the joint action, as in Study 2, this
dampening effect did not preclude them.
7.1 | Consequences for the debate between Bratman and Gilbert
While these results support the normativist thesis in general, the implications for the specific debate
are less clear. While both Gilbert and Bratman do not claim that actors in joint actions must believe
that there are particular joint intentions or commitments between themselves (Bratman, 2013,
pp. 114–115), they do both employ a descriptive methodology that relies on our intuitions about
actual cases of acting together in order to argue that there are these joint intentions or commitments
present in cases of joint action. Furthermore, they do not provide an alternate method of determining
the constitutive features of joint action. We attempt to model this methodology in our vignettes by
asking the participants about their intuitive judgments rather than about the presence of obligations or
rights directly. Thus, determining whether it would be acceptable or not to walk away or call out
reveals the implicit understandings of the normative relations amongst the joint actors rather than par-
ticipants' explicit beliefs about those normative relations. Both Bratman and Gilbert attempt to do the
same with the intuition-pumps they provide to motivate their philosophical arguments.
If these behavioral cues do track implicit understandings of normative relations, two of our cen-
tral findings speak against Bratman. First, even in Bratman's paradigmatic walking together case, par-
ticipants judged that there was both an obligation to notify and a right to rebuke. As Bratman's
argument relies on there being cases of modest sociality that involve joint intentions but no distinc-
tive normative relations (2013, p. 107), the fact that one of his favorite examples does involve norma-
tive relations suggests that his model of joint action is mistaken. It is important to highlight that some
non-normativist thought experiments do not generate the intuitions that they are supposed to. People
do not have the intended intuitions about these cases, and, at the moment, there is no empirical evi-
dence about cases that support a non-normativist view. However, our results obviously do not defini-
tively prove that no such cases exist. There may be other examples that better fit a non-normativist
view. Nonetheless, it seems that, at least for the debate between Bratman and Gilbert, our studies shift
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the burden of proof back onto Bratman to detail an example of modest sociality that does not involve
obligations and rights. At the same time, such a move would lend credence and validate our method-
ology of testing intuitions. Second, these results suggest that there are at least two separate kinds of
normativity, a point that Bratman denies (2013, pp. 111–113). As Bratman makes clear, on his view,
any obligations that arise in joint actions are familiar moral obligations. At the same time, it seems
difficult to square this with the intuition that one ATM robber has an obligation to notify the other
that they are going to leave (Study 6). If all that's involved is moral obligation, then the obligation
that the ATM robber has is to terminate the immoral act as quickly as possible.
While these considerations do speak against Bratman's view, it is not clear that they are fully in
line with Gilbert's view of what these normative relations are. According to Gilbert, a joint action
involves a joint commitment, and joint commitments come with a series of normative consequences,
which we have not tested here (2006, 2009, 2013). For example, joint commitments, unlike personal
commitments, cannot be rescinded unilaterally, which means that a joint commitment can only be ter-
minated jointly (2013, p. 32). With respect to joint intention, Gilbert states this in terms of the “con-
currence criterion”:
An adequate account of shared intention will entail that, absent special background
understandings, the concurrence of all parties is required in order that a given shared
intention be changed or rescinded, or that a given party be released from participating
in it (2009, p. 173).
Our studies concern the obligation to notify, which, while showing the presence of some kind of nor-
mative relation, is weaker than the concurrence condition, as it does not involve seeking the permis-
sion of the other party, which is what Gilbertian joint commitment requires (2013, p. 25).
Additionally, Gilbertian joint commitments create more than just obligations to notify—they cre-
ate obligations to perform the contributory actions necessary for the completion of the joint action.
She states that “By virtue of the existence of the [joint] commitment, and that alone, the parties have
rights against each other to actions that conform to the commitment” (2006, p. 148). These rights and
entitlements to rebuke suggest that each party to the joint commitment has an obligation to carry out
their part in the joint action (1990, pp. 180–181). These kinds of obligations go far beyond a simple
obligation to notify. Consider the bank robber case. Participants thought that there was an obligation
to notify, but it is not clear that they would also think that there is an obligation to perform an action
in conformance with the overall joint action of robbing the ATM.
Our motivation for choosing the obligation to notify as the relevant indicator of normative rela-
tions is that it appears to be the weakest form of normativity specific to joint action. As a result, if
our studies had shown that even it was not present in cases of acting together, the non-normativist
side would have a clear advantage in this debate. Additionally, the most important case in the debate
between Gilbert and Bratman is the walking together case, and in his example, Bratman denies
exactly such an obligation. Showing that this obligation appears to be present is a vital step forward
in the debate. However, it leaves many questions open about the type of normativity involved.
One natural objection to our results concerns the epistemic role and weight of empirical investiga-
tions of philosophically relevant intuitions. Though Tollefsen and colleagues have recently provided
a defence of the empirical examination of intuitions in social philosophy, particularly concerning
joint action, normativists may suggest that their investigations into joint action aim at metaphysical
truths that escape from, or fail to reflect, folk intuitions (Tollefsen et al., 2014, pp. 250–251). The
implication of this claim is that research on the content and psychological genesis of intuitions can
neither adjudicate between, nor serve as sound premises in, metaphysical theories of joint action.
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There are at least two reasons to resist this conclusion. First, a wholesale denunciation of intuitions
jeopardizes the non-normativist project. Non-normativist arguments often depend on the evidentiary
status of thought experiments that aim to drive our intuitions about the normative status of joint
actions. If those thought experiments fail to drive the relevant intuitions, as we have discovered in
our work, it then gives non-normativists cause to refine their thought experiments or proffer testable
explanations for why it is that they failed to elicit the relevant intuitions. We should recognize that
these cycles of testing and refinement can only help to narrow and strengthen the evidentiary founda-
tions of whatever theory results. Rejecting such cycles commits one to a theory that is autonomous
and decoupled from the agents that realize it, leaving it, in principle, untestable and unfalsifiable.
The second reason to resist a rejection of intuitional methodologies is that the genesis of folk intu-
itions is a relevant philosophical question in its own right (Knobe & Nichols, 2008, p. 14). Correlat-
ing how people generate and alter their intuitions with changes in word prompts, or stimuli more
generally, gives us purchase on the kinds of mental and psychological mechanisms that underwrite
the phenomena at hand. Given that we are focused on joint action, a phenomenon that involves inter-
subjective interaction, such a psychological project is especially germane. As we discuss in the fol-
lowing sub-section, understanding the psychological systems that are involved in recognizing and
moderating joint action is at least one important avenue for further research that would be limited by
a rejection of intuitional methods.
7.2 | Further research directions
These considerations, along with the framework and paradigms devised in our studies, open sig-
nificant areas for further research. By conducting future studies we can determine more precisely
whether our common intuitions support a Gilbertian view of normative relations between partici-
pants or some other, perhaps weaker, form (Roth, 2004, 2014). Normativists have done exten-
sive work clarifying the nature of the normative relations involved in joint action. For example,
both Gilbert and Roth argue that the obligations in joint action are directed at specific individ-
uals, and can be characterized in terms of ownership not present for third-parties (Gilbert, 2006,
pp. 35–41; Roth, 2004, p. 364). Determining whether participants pick up on the possible
directed nature of these normative obligations is a clear avenue for further extensions of our
work. One possibility would include recording participants' written answers to our prompts.
With the rigorous application of coding schemata, along with the use of coders who are blinded
to our hypotheses, we may be able to categorize and understand the range of motivations under-
lying our effect.
Another important consideration is that our vignettes were framed in third-personal language,
while the story is told in the second person in Bratman's original example. Glancing through the com-
mon thought experiments given in the literature, it appears that stories meant to elicit normative intui-
tions are usually told in the third person, and those meant to elicit non-normative intuitions are
usually told in the first or second person.34 As a result, it is worth exploring whether we are generally
normativists in the third person and non-normativists in the first and second person, giving rise to a
pluralist account of joint action.
Additionally, it may be fruitful to test whether these same kinds of normativity are similarly
instantiated in other cultures. It is possible that the norms that govern joint action are culturally
34 Compare, for example, the car pushing case from Searle (1990, p. 3), or the walking case in Bratman (2006, p. 7; 2013,
pp. 107–109), as well as his later discussion (2009, pp. 151–152), all of which are couched in first or second personal language, to the
original walking case in Gilbert (1990, pp. 2–9) and her other examples (2006, pp. 103–124; 2009, p. 168ff; 2013, p. 24ff ), which are
all in the third person. Thanks to Bryce Huebner for pointing this out to us.
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dependent, and that our particular responses to our partner's contributory actions or lack thereof is
socially conditioned. Testing for the presence of such norms against distinct social and cultural
backgrounds may provide important evidence about the relationship between our biological nature,
how we act together, and the social and cultural practices we develop. Relatedly, further research
should also be conducted on larger groups involved in joint actions. All our cases deal with dyads.
There may be important differences in the strength of normativity between two people acting
together and larger joint actions involving division of tasks, spatial distance, mediated communica-
tion, and so on.
Another direction for continuing research focuses on how deeply-seated these normative relations
are. Research (Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello & Racokzy, 2003) suggests that the capacity for joint
action, as related in the philosophical literature, is present very early on in human development and
may be the distinctive mark of human beings. Although he is noncommittal about exactly which
account of joint action he accepts (Schmid, 2012), he seems to favor a two-step model, in which there
is a basic ability at an early stage based on the non-normativist account of Searle, and a more devel-
oped version that arises later in development and includes Gilbertian normativity. Supplementary
investigation of the association between joint action and normativity in human cognition engenders
the possibility of fruitful collaboration with developmental, evolutionary, and neuroscientific
perspectives.
Continuing this empirical trajectory for future research, the magnitude and robustness of our
findings can be taken as evidence for the recruitment of a cognitive component involved in the
identification and tracking of joint actions or commitments. Novel paradigms, for instance involv-
ing eye-tracking of stimuli, might help us uncover whether and to what extent subpersonal cogni-
tive systems are involved in these discriminations and determinations of joint action. However, it's
likely we can gain purchase on this hypothesis by modifying a simple perceptual animacy para-
digm, where various colored two-dimensional shapes follow or interact with one another, similar to
those devised by Michotte (1963) (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). If participants are similarly sensitive
to the behavioral cues implicit in “joint actions” when instantiated by lifeless two-dimensional
objects, then we will have strong evidence that there are low-level cognitive components involved
in these judgments.
8 | CONCLUSION
The importance of continuing empirical research into the domain of joint action is clear. What these
findings already suggest, however, is that our common intuitions are in line with a general form of
the normativist thesis. When two people are acting together, we seem to attribute some basic norma-
tive relations to them, and when we have evidence of some normative relations between them, we
take them to be acting together. Furthermore, because this normativity is directed at the other partici-
pants in the joint action and is present even in morally questionable cases, it is distinct from general
moral obligations and rights, despite being influenced by global norms. Taken together, these results
support the claims that joint actions are inherently normative, and that this normativity is distinct
from morality.
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